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A Unique Informationally Efficient and 
Decentralized Mechanism with Fair Outcomes*
by
Xavier Calsamiglia1 2 and Alan Kirman3 
ABSTRACT
In this paper we consider the informational requirements o f decentralised 
resource allocation mechanisms which attain both fair and efficient outcomes in pure 
exchange classical environments. We show that the only informationally efficient 
mechanism which will attain such allocations is the equal income Walrasian 
mechanism, in which all agents take prices as given and maximise utility subject to the 
average income constraint.
1 Presented at the World Meeting o f the Econometric Society, Barcelona 1990. We are grateful to 
Anna Cima, Peter Hammond, Carmen Herrero, Antonio Manresa and Antonio Villar for their helpful 
comments. We also thank Martin Hellwig and an anonymous referee, both o f whose extensive 
comments have led to a considerable improvement in the exposition. Responsibility for remaining 
defects or errors is, o f course, our own. This research has beep supported by the CICYT grant it 
87075.
-  Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Instituto de Analisis Econòmico, Barcelona.






















































































































































































A unique informationally efficient and decentralized 
mechanism with fair outcomes'
by
Xavier Calsamiglia2 and Alan Kirmar)3
1. Introduction
Following the pioneering work of Hurwicz [1969] and Mount and Reiter 
[1974], there has been a significant amount of work in trying to determine the 
informational requirements of decentralized resource allocation mechanisms. By 
mechanism here we mean a system which communicates knowledge which is 
dispersed among agents and uses it to determine the allocation of resources. Agents 
send messages and these are translated into outcomes. In particular, the focus in the 
literature has been on the dimension of the space of messages used for 
communication between agents. These informational requirements depend upon two 
basic elements: the class of environments over which the mechanism is supposed to 
operate and the particular outcomes that the mechanism is required to achieve.
Most of the literature has centered on the informational requirements for 
obtaining Pareto optimal allocations in different environments. In this paper we 
discuss the information needed to obtain a more restricted class of outcomes: those 
which are both efficient and envy free in the context of pure exchange classical 
environments. The interest in such allocations is a long-standing one, and although 
the definition we use is that of Foley [1967], the underlying notion goes back to the 
ancient Egyptians and has been formally investigated in another context by Dubins 
and Spanier [1961]4. Intuitively, it might seem that a great deal of information 1234
1 Presented at the World Meeting of the Econometric Society, Barcelona 1990. We are grateful to Anna Cima, 
Peter Hammond, Carmen Herrero, Antonio Manresa and Antonio Villar tor their helpful comments. We also thank 
Martin Hellwig and an anonymous referee, both of whose extensive comments have led to a considerable 
improvement in the exposition. Responsibility for remaining defects or errors is, of course, our own. This research 
has been supported by the CICYT grant tf 87075.
2 Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Institute de Analisis Economico, Barcelona.
3 European University Institute, Florence.




























































































would be required to obtain such outcomes since establishing whether an allocation 
is fair would seem to involve each agent comparing his allocation with that of 
everyone else and this would require knowing the total endowments of all agents. 
However, we will show that in fact very little more information is needed to obtain 
fairness in addition to efficiency and, in particular, we will prove rigorously the idea 
suggested by Thomson and Varian [1985] that we can actually specify a mechanism 
which is the only one involving minimal informational requirements.
The design of a particular mechanism involves the specification of a message 
space (i.e. the set of signals used for communication), the response functions (i.e. 
how individuals choose the messages they send) and a rule to recognize the so called 
equilibrium messages, which are messages that indicate that the decisions of the 
independent agents have been coordinated. These equilibrium messages are then 
mapped by an outcome function into the allocations. The message space, response 
functions, equilibrium rules and outcome functions are regarded as chosen by the 
mechanism designer and not by the individuals. If all the outcomes of the mechanism 
are the ones prescribed by a social choice rule (also chosen by the designer) then it is 
said that the mechanism realizes that social choice rule. The problem of why the 
agent should be motivated to send the messages and behave in the way prescribed by 
the mechanism, that is the problem of incentive compatibility, is not directly dealt 
with, though useful discussions may be found in Hurwicz [1976], Reichelstein
[1984] and Reichelstein and Reiter [1988]. The problem we address in this paper is 
of the following nature: given a social choice rule (fair allocations in our case), find a 
decentralized mechanism that realizes it with minimal message spaces. The question 
of its implementation is not considered. It is clear that the competitive mechanism 
which receives particular attention here has the same incentive compatibility problem 
as in the standard general equilibrium model. Agents' messages cannot be regarded 
as best responses in finite economies in a game theoretic sense. However, given the 
instructions received from the mechanism designer, they reflect the best choice.
There has been considerable work done on the problem of the informational 
requirements of an allocation mechanism which ensures efficient outcomes in 
classical environments (Mount and Reiter [1974], Hurwicz [1977], Osana [1978], 
Chander [1982] and Calsamiglia [1987]). This has been extended to environments 
with public goods (Sato [1981]), and those which are stochastic (Jordan [1977]), 
non-convex (Calsamiglia [1977,1982,1987]), discrete (Hurwicz and Marschak
[1985] ) and intertemporal (Hurwicz and Majumdar [1988], Brock and Majumdar 
[1988] and Dasgupta and Mitra [1988]).
The outcomes that are selected as socially desirable are chosen by the designer, 
and in our case his two criteria are efficiency and fairness. He does not require that 
the agents should be able to verify these properties but merely affirms that these are 
the desired properties of acceptable outcomes. Indeed, since the process is 
decentralized and informationally efficient, it is not possible for the individuals 
themselves with the information at their disposal to check that the outcome is fair 




























































































In the context of classical environments the competitive mechanism plays a 
special role and indeed Jordan [1982] has shown that, under certain assumptions, it 
is the unique informationally efficient way of obtaining Pareto optimality. This will 
be important in what follows.
We know that, in classical environments, if all agents have the same 
consumption sets there always exist fair and efficient allocations.5 This was shown 
by considering the Walrasian outcomes obtained after dividing income equally 
between all agents (Kolm [1972] and Feldman and Kirman [1974]). This indicates 
the route to follow. Since the competitive mechanism is informationally efficient in 
obtaining Pareto outcomes, all that remains is to distribute income equally. The 
question is how much additional information it is necessary to convey in order to 
perform the required redistribution.
The equal income Walrasian mechanism has received considerable attention in 
the literature. Apart from the papers mentioned above, results by Maskin [1977] and 
Thompson [1979,1982] show that any Nash implementable social choice 
correspondence is closely related to the equal income Walrasian correspondence. 
Furthermore, as Varian [1976], Hammond [1979], Kleinberg [1980], Champsaur and 
Laroque [1981] and Mas-Colell [1983, 1985] have shown, in economies with a large 
number of agents with sufficiently diverse characteristics the only fair outcomes are 
equal income Walrasian allocations. However, if there is not enough diversity or not 
enough agents it is known that many other fair and efficient allocations may exist.
The three basic results of this paper also indicate the central position of the 
Walrasian mechanism from a different perspective. They can be summarized as 
follows:
First, any informationally decentralized mechanism that realizes fair allocations 
over the class of classical pure exchange environments has a message space of 
dimension greater than or equal to n /, that is the number of agents times the number 
of commodities.
Second, the equal income Walrasian mechanism, in which all agents take prices 
parametrically and maximize utility subject to the average income constraint, 
realizes fair outcomes over the class of classical pure exchange environments and 
has a message space of dimension n/. Besides the typical competitive message, 
every agent has to send a real number expressing the value of his initial endowments 
at going prices. Thus, the equal income Walrasian mechanism is informationally 
efficient.
Third, although in the class of environments considered there exist many fair 
allocations which are not equal income Walrasian allocations, we show that a 
mechanism that selects some of these necessarily has strictly larger informational 5
5 If consumption sets are not identical, for example if there are non transferable commodities, then fair 
allocations may not exist. In particular, Pazner and Schmeidler [1974] and Tillmann [1989] have shown that, in a 




























































































requirements. In other words, if we insist on mechanisms with message spaces of 
minimal dimension, then the Walrasian mechanism from equal incomes is in fact the 
unique candidate.
2. Structure of the argument.
To establish the framework let us look at the classical problem of obtaining 
Pareto optimal outcomes in an informationally efficient way. In the Walrasian 
competitive mechanism only net trades and prices must be known to check that a 
given outcome is Pareto efficient. But this information is compatible with infinitely 
many different economies (represented by different Edgeworth boxes and 
indifference curves) as shown in figure 1. The fact that there is no need to 
distinguish between all of these is at the basis of the strong result that a finite 
dimensional message space (of dimension n(f-l)) is sufficient to select Pareto 
efficient allocations over an infinite dimensional class of economies.
The Walrasian mechanism achieves this in an informationally decentralized 
way. In a decentralized mechanism, the decision process is decomposed into two 
phases. In the first phase there is a communication process. Because of the assumed 
initial dispersion of information, messages sent by agents depend only on messages 
of other agents and their own characteristics. This important feature of the 
communication process implies that the so called “crossing condition” has to be 
satisfied: if two economies have the same equilibrium message, any “crossed 
economy” in which one agent from one of the two initial economies is “switched” 
with an agent from the other, must have the same equilibrium message^.
Since for a given mechanism the translation of the equilibrium message into an 
action (net trade) is precisely prescribed by an outcome Junction, z=h(m), if two 
economies have the same equilibrium message m, then the mechanism leads to the 
same action z for both. These two important features of any informationally 
decentralized mechanism have important implications that we are going to discuss.
Consider a mechanism that selects Pareto optimal outcomes and two economies 
which have the same equilibrium message. Then two facts are necessarily true. First, 
the common outcome z of the mechanism leads to an allocation which is Pareto 
efficient for both economies. Second, this very same trade z must also be the 
outcome of the mechanism for any of the “crossed” economies because of the 
“crossing condition”. Therefore the trade z must lead to final allocations which are 
Pareto efficient not only in the two initial economies, but also in all the “crossed” 
economies.
This is illustrated in figure 1. Consider an economy represented by the 
Edgeworth box ABCD and the continuous indifference curves. The point w 
represents the initial endowments and z the trade leading to the final allocation x. A 
second economy is represented by the Edgeworth box EFGH and the dotted 6




























































































indifference curves respectively. It is easily seen that both economies have the same 
equilibrium message (p,z) and that the trade z leads to an allocation x  which is Pareto 
efficient for both. Now consider the crossed economy in which we take the first 
agent from the first economy and the second agent from the second economy. The 
Edgeworth box for this economy is given by AIGK and the relevant indifference 
curves are one continuous and the other dotted. It is immediately seen that for this 
“crossed economy” the trade z still leads to a Pareto efficient allocation, as was to be 
expected from our previous argument. It is clear that the same competitive message 
is compatible with Edgeworth boxes of completely different sizes. This means that 
the equilibrium message does not reveal the “size” of the economy since no agent 
has any idea about the aggregate initial endowments.
Now, suppose that we are interested in a mechanism whose outcomes are not 
only Pareto optimal, but also fair. The competitive mechanism does not guarantee 
such outcomes. Notice that the allocation x  happens to be fair for the economy 
EFGH, but not for ABCD. It seems clear that, to check whether an allocation is fair 
as well as being efficient, some information concerning the “size” of the Edgeworth 
box is needed. Indeed, the information needed turns out to be more than that of the 
competitive mechanism, but not very much . At given prices let agents simply 
announce their incomes in addition to their information on net trades and prices, that 
is one extra real number per individual. Then let them maximize their utilities 
subject to the average income constraint. This mechanism guarantees fair and Pareto 
efficient allocations and has an n ̂ dimensional message space.
Next we show that these are the minimal informational requirements of any 
decentralized mechanism that selects fair and efficient outcomes. The basic 
argument is fairly simple. Think of a class of economies in which all consumers 
have the same utility function, a Cobb Douglas with unit coefficients for 




























































































"canonical" economies, with its associated "canonical” utility function will be 
particularly useful in what follows. It is clear that the only fair efficient allocation in 
such an economy is to give each agent the same bundle, i.e., to choose the allocation 
at the center of the Edgeworth box. To identify an economy in this class requires 
only the complete description of the initial bundles of all n agents, i.e., n bundles of 
/goods. Thus its dimension is n /  Now we claim that, in any informationally 
decentralized mechanism, two different economies in that subclass E* must use 
different messages. Indeed, suppose that we have a mechanism for which two 
different economies share the same equilibrium message m. Consequently, the 
outcome of the mechanism in both economies must also be the same trade z. 
Consider the situation depicted in figure 2. We have two different economies, 
represented by the two Edgeworth boxes ABCD and EFGH, which have the same 
trade z as the outcome?. This outcome is fair because the final allocation point x 
obtained with the trade z from the initial endowment point to is the center of the box 
for both economies. However, by the crossing condition, the “crossed economies” 
will have the same equilibrium message and consequently they must have the same 
outcome z. It is easily seen that, with the same trade, the final outcome x  for the 
crossed economy given by the Edgeworth box EJCK is not fair because it is not in 
the center.The same argument holds for the other crossed economy: x is not at the 
center of AIGL. Therefore every economy in the subclass considered must use 
different messages. Hence the message space has to be at least as “big” as the « /  
dimensional class of environment. If some regularity conditions are satisfied the 
dimension of the message space cannot be smaller than n /' This establishes the 




In the preceding argument we have been considering a very specific class of 
environments in which all agents have identical preferences. The information needed 
to attain fair efficient allocations within that restricted class is the same as that of the
^ Since utility functions are assumed to be Cobb-Douglas, the flatter indifference curves correspond to the 





























































































equal income Walrasian mechanism. Of course, for this class there are other 
mechanisms which use the same amount of information. Think, for example, of a 
mechanism in which every agent simply announces his own bundle. The average 
bundle can then be computed and the appropriate trades assigned to every agent. 
Within this restricted class of economies, this mechanism is essentially equivalent to 
the equal income Walrasian one because it yields precisely the same outcomes. The 
latter mechanism has a satisfactory performance over a much larger class of 
environments in which agents can have different utility functions. However, over 
this larger class of environments the "bundle announcing" mechanism generally 
yields outcomes which are not even Pareto efficient, whilst the equal income 
Walrasian gives both efficiency and fairness.
It is important to note that the equilibrium message ( prices, trades and 
individual incomes) for the equal income Walrasian mechanism does not reveal the 
particular Edgeworth box describing the economy. This must be so since, as we have 
seen, to specify the box completely requires «/dimensional messages. However, to 
ensure efficiency in the general case, one needs to communicate supporting prices 
and in order to keep the message space to the same dimension, some information 
about the Edgeworth box must be sacrificed. This is illustrated in figure 3, where a 
whole class of Edgeworth boxes compatible with the same equal income Walrasian 
equilibrium message is shown : the upper-right comer of the box can be located at 
any point on the aggregate income budget line, 2A 2B , which is clearly twice that 
facing both individuals.
Finally, in section 6 and 7, we show that the only mechanism with minimal 
informational requirements achieving fair efficient outcomes is the equal income 
Walrasian one. Here we will sketch the argument used in the formal proof. Firstly, 
recall that if Pareto efficient outcomes are to be obtained in classical environments at 
least the information concerning supporting prices and competitive net trades must 
be conveyed. Furthermore, if fairness is required, as we have seen, some information 




























































































obtained by eliciting agents' incomes, for example. Now our requirement of 
informational efficiency means that we are interested in mechanisms which use no 
more than this to attain fair efficient outcomes.
Our first step is to define a notion of "similarity" of an economy 2 to another 
e*. Similarity here means that if we consider an equilibrium net trade z (for some 
informationally efficient mechanism) for e and the associated supporting prices and 
incomes at the resultant final allocation, then the same trade gives rise to the same 
prices and incomes in e*. We prove that if e is similar to e* and if, moreover e* is 
in the special class of “canonical” economies to which we referred earlier, then z is 
also an equilibrium trade for e*. This implies that in an informationally efficient 
mechanism similar economies have the same equilibrium messages^.
We now proceed as follows: firstly, suppose that we have an informationally 
efficient mechanism which does not always select equal income competitive 
outcomes, but sometimes selects other fair and efficient ones. The latter must have 
the property that, at the prices implied by the common slope of the indifference 
curves, incomes are different. This is illustrated in figure 4 for individuals i and k of 
the economy e that gives rise to an equilibrium trade t  and supporting price p.
This allocation is fair since individual i does not envy individual k and vice 
versa. Now, however, we will construct a "similar" economy,e*, that is one in 
which the equilibrium net trades of individuals, the slopes of their indifference 
curves and their incomes at those prices are all the same as in 2, and in particular all 
individuals have the “canonical” utility function u*. Hence the final allocations of all 
agents will be along the same ray from the origin. To obtain our special similar 
economy we modify each of the agents’ characteristics by bending and sliding down 8




























































































(or up) the indifference map along a given hyperplane as long as the tangency is 
preserved till we obtain the indifference curve of the “canonical” function. The 
initial endowments are then modified accordingly so as to preserve the same trade. 
The transition from the economy e to e* is illustrated in figure 5 for agent k.
Now the essential point is that, in the similar economy e* we construct, agent i 
is envious of agent k. Consider the situation in figure 6.
Each of the agents constructed in this way, has endowments to*, the canonical 
utility function u*, and the same income as before. Clearly, however, agent i is now 
envious of agent A:. Thusz is not an equilibrium trade for e* which contradicts our 




























































































situation in figure 4 as an outcome must be able to distinguish between that and the 
situation in figure 6. This requires more information about the utility function and 
would therefore be more informationally demanding than the equal income 
Walrasian mechanism. This means that it cannot have been informationally efficient 
in the first place.
3. Informationally decentralized mechanisms.
Consider an exchange economy with £ commodities, and a set of agents 
~ s = { l Every agent /£.? is characterized by a utility function u‘, and an 
initial endowment cof The i-th agent's characteristic is denoted by e‘=(u‘,to*). An 
economy is denoted by the n-tuple e=(el,e^,.. ,,en). The class of possible economies, 
denoted by E, reflects the a priori knowledge available on the agents characteristics.
Let UP denote the set of all utility functions wL9l + —>M such that there exists a
vector a  6 ?)? ++ with
( x f i .
The space IP is topologized as 91 + + and its generic element will be denoted 
either by a 1 or ul. Define the class of Cobb-Douglas environments
Ec={(el,e~,.. .,en): forali /€ $ , m*€ UP, co!eStrand £«*' > 0}. 
i=l
Although most of the paper deals with the performance of decentralized 
mechanisms in the class of Cobb-Douglas environments, we shall specify a more 
general class of environments in which utility functions are not necessarily Cobb- 
Douglas. In order to ensure that equilibrium prices are strictly positive, we shall 
postulate a special type of strict monotonicity, in which monotonicity is not 
necessarily strict on the boundary (as is the case with Cobb-Douglas preferences). 
Hence, the set of possible utility functions Uis defined as follows.
To every real valued continuous utility function u on 81 {  we associate a set 
XfuJ defined as :
X(u) = i
= 9Ì + + if for any x the set {x€dl {:u(x)>u(x)} is contained in 9Ì 
= Si {  otherwise.
/+ + .
Now, let IP  be the set of all real valued functions such that iJ is continuous, 
strictly monotone on X(u‘) and strictly quasi-concave. Then we can define the 




























































































E8={(efe^,...,en): for all idtf, u‘d L/%, w 'eSt^and £ u t  > 0}
i=l
Let xi denote the consumption vector of the i-th agent and let z*=xi-to* denote 
the net trade vector. Let Jt=(<7 j f , . . .jJ1) and z-{zKz?,.. .,zn) denote respectively the 
n-tuples of consumption and net trades.
The set of possible outcomes of a resource allocation mechanism is given by
n
the set of feasible net trades Z = {zd S i^ :  I *  =0}. The Pareto optimality
i - I
correspondence P.E-* Z assigns to every economy edE  the set of Pareto optimal 
trades. For brevity we call a trade fair if the resulting allocation is both Pareto 
optimal and envy-free^. Hence a net trade z is fair for the economy ed E if z £  P(e) 
and for all agents i and k, ui(x*)>ui(xk), that is, there is no agent who envies other 
agent. Let F :E -*Z  denote the correspondence that assigns to every economy edE  
the set of fair trades.
Following Mount and Reiter [1974], an allocation mechanism is a triple 
n=(M ,p,/i), where M  is a set of abstract messages, p:E -»M  is a message 
correspondence that assigns to every economy the set of equilibrium messages, and 
h:M-> Z is the outcome function, that assigns to every equilibrium message the 
corresponding net trade. An allocation mechanism is decisive over the class of 
economies E  if for every edE, \s(e)*e>. An allocation mechanism is fa ir  over the 
class of economies E  if it is decisive and for every edE, and every zdhfoi(e)/, 
zdF(e).
Given e and e in E, the “crossed” economy ( e f e ^ , ~d,e‘ + ̂ ,...,en) is 
denoted by e®ie, for ie S , while e=e®0e. A resource allocation mechanism 
n=(Af,p,/i) is privacy preserving over the class of economies E  if for every ie S and 
every e and e in E, n(e)C\^(e)*0 implies p f whenever
e®i~e and e®ie belong to E. This means that if m is an equilibrium message for both 
e and e in E than it must also be an equilibrium message for any “crossed” economy. 
If the class of economies £  is a cartesian product E=E1 *E2*...*EP, then the 
privacy property can be characterized in terms of “coordinate” correspondences 10, 
as established by the following proposition due to Mount and Reiter.
3.1. LEMMA (Mount and Reiter [1974,Lemma 5, p. 171). Let the class of economies 
E be the cartesian product E=El * E? * EF.  Then a mechanism n=(M,p,A) is
^ Thus we do not follow the terminology used by Schmeidler and Vind (1972].
10 See Chander [1983, p.983] for a discussion of this more general definition of the privacy property and its 




























































































privacy preserving on E  if and only if for every t'e.3 there exists a correspondence 
p'.-f? -* M such that for every e€E, life)- f\zjli‘(e‘)
In this case, in a privacy preserving mechanism every agent can check 
independently whether a given message is an equilibrium message by looking at 
their own characteristics, wt€ nl(e‘). The initial dispersion of information (every 
agent is assumed to know his own characteristics) and the privacy property 
(according to which the knowledge of other agents' characteristics is conveyed 
through formal messages) are the basic ingredients of the concept of informational 
decentralization. In what follows, a mechanism satisfying the privacy property will 
be said to be informationally decentralized.
The problem that we want to address is the minimal amount of information 
contained in M which is sufficient to guarantee that the mechanism yields fair 
outcomes over the class of classical economies 11. Furthermore, we would like to 
know which are the properties that an informationally efficient (i.e., using minimal 
message spaces) mechanism must necessarily have.
4. The equal income Walrasian mechanism.
Let A=/p€?K denote the f-1 dimensional simplex and define the
/> n ■ 1 nhaessage space M w={(p,z,r)£A*dl"1*Sin: Y . i~ 0 andpz.k = -  $V -rty , where p is
i=l n i - l
a vector of normalized prices, z is a n-tuple of net trades and r= (r f r^,...,rn) is the 
vector of initial incomes (or values of initial endowments). Now, for every agent, 
define the correspondence -*M h> as follows: a message (p,z,r) is an 
equilibrium message from the point of view of agent i, (p,Zr)& p ^ fe1), if the
following two conditions are satisfied:
( 1)




According to the second condition, every agent checks whether the proposed 
initial income r‘ corresponds to the value of his initial endowments at the going 
prices. According to the first condition, the agent maximizes utility subject to the 
average income constraint. This last magnitude can be computed by the agent from
*1 By classical economies, we understand the class of economies satisfying the conditions sufficient to 




























































































the messages sent by others. The message correspondence and outcome function are 
then defined as
Hence, the equal income Walrasian mechanism is given by FIw={Mw,[xw,h\v). 
It follows from (1) that any equilibrium message (p,z,r) satisfies the following 
equality:
It is easily verified that Mw is a smooth «/dimensional manifold.
5. Informational requirements for fair allocations
In this section we study the minimal amount of information - as measured by 
the dimension of the message space - that is required to guarantee that an 
informationally decentralized mechanism leads to fair outcomes over the general 
class of environments ES. Let us define the canonical subclass of economies E*. 
An economy is a member of E* if all agents have identical preferences which can 
be represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function with unit coefficients. More 
specifically,
Thus, in an economy with « agents and /commodities, every environment in 
the subclass E* is completely specified by «/dim ensional vectors of initial
restricted to E* is a single-valued function.
LEMMA 5.1. Let <?€£& be such that all agents have identical utilities so that 
U =u for all i. Suppose further that z£F(e). Then for all agents we must have
. t  / » ;
PROOF : It suffices to show that for all i and k in 3 , io*+z* =^k+zk p js clear 
that, since all agents have the same utility function u, fairness implies that
and k such that to'+z^to^+z^. Then we can construct a new trade z which is 
Pareto superior to z. Indeed, define
(2) I f - 'b -
(3)
J
endowments. Hence dim E*= «• /  Now we shall show that the fair correspondence F
w*+é  = -  £ccL




























































































while V=z) for all other agents. Then, the new final consumption vectors satisfy
+x^). By strict quasiconcavity of the common utility function u it
follows that u(u>‘ + &) >m(u)*+zO and u (u / + &)>u(io^+zfy, while all other 
agents are indifferent since they receive the same consumption vector. 
Moreover, since #+2^=z,+ z^ it follows that z is a feasible trade. This 
contradiction completes the proof.
Lemma 5.1 implies that in an economy with identical individuals, the only fair 
allocation is the equal division of total endowments. In particular, this is true for our 
canonical subclass E*. Now we shall show the basic theorem of this section.
THE INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY THEOREM 5.2. Suppose that n=<M,p,/i> is a 
resource allocation on E8 such that:
a) it is fair on Eg,
b) it is informationally decentralized,
c) the message space M is a manifold,
d) when restricted to E* the message correspondence is locally threaded at 
some point e 12.
Then the dimension of the message space is at least as large as that of the equal 
income Walrasian mechanism defined in section 4, that is, dimM>dimMw
PROOF: We first show that the restriction of m to E* is an injective 
correspondence. Suppose that mCnfejrIpfe). We have to show that this implies 
e = e. Since the mechanism is assumed to be informationally decentralized, it 
follows from the privacy property that m^n(e®ie)C\^i(e®ie) for all i. But if the 
mechanism is fair this implies that the outcome z = h(rh) satisfies
z€F(e®ie) => ooi+?=co^+z^ for all
z£F(e®i&) => (bk+z/c for all /te.3
From these two equalities it follows that Since the argument can be
repeated for any other agent, it is clear that the initial endowments are the same 
in both economies and therefore e=e. Using assumption d, let Uz be an open 
neighborhood of e and a continuous function such that f(e)£ \i(e) for all
e€ U. Then / i s  a continuous injection from U to f[UJ. Since U and M are 
manifolds, we can use Theorem 18 in Kelley [1955] to conclude that /  is a 
homeomorphism between U and f[UJ. Then dim Mw=rv /=dim U<dimM.
Let X and Y be topological spaces. A correspondence tp.'X-* Lis said to be locally threaded at r t  A' if there 




























































































The intuition behind this result is clear: the message space has to contain at 
least as much information as the subclass of environments E* because every 
environment in E* must have a different message. Therefore the message space has 
to contain enough information so as to distinguish between members of E*.
Notice that in order to guarantee Pareto optimal allocations the minimal 
informational requirements are those of the competitive process, i.e. n(f-l). The 
preceding theorem suggests the possibility of realizing a stronger optimality 
correspondence through mechanisms which require every agent to send just an 
additional real number. In the following proposition we show that the equal income 
Walrasian mechanism defined in section 4 is an informationally decentralized 
process satisfying all the assumptions of the informational efficiency theorem whose 
message space is of dimension n-f.
COROLLARY 5.3. The equal income Walrasian mechanism is informationally 
efficient on Eg.
PROOF: It is c lear from  the construction  o f  Ylw=(Mw, \iW,h\\) that it is  
inform ationally decentralized and that Mw is a m anifold o f  d im ension n-zf It is a lso  
clear that from the con d ition s defin ing  the c la ss  E8 it can be sh ow n that the 
com petitive  equilibrium  from average incom e ex ists , is  Pareto optim al and envy- 
free. F inally, the correspondence pvv when restricted to E* is a continuous function  
and thus it is locally  threaded at any e £ £ * .
6. The uniqueness theorem in Cobh-Douglas economies.
In this section and the next we follow the basic strategy of the proof given by 
Jordan for the uniqueness of the competitive mechanism in achieving efficiency in 
classical environments. Our proof differs from his in several essential respects, and 
it is worth indicating the differences between our problem and his, and the way in 
which our proof is adapted to handle them. Firstly, in his problem parallel 
supporting hyperplanes are necessary for efficiency. In our case, the equality of 
incomes and of supporting hyperplanes is not necessary for achieving fairness and 
efficiency. Secondly, we construct a class of economies, those with what we have 
called "canonical" preferences for all individuals, where the fair outcome is unique 
and is also efficient. There is no equivalent in the ordinary efficiency problem. 
Thirdly, when considering the problem of how much information is necessary to 
discriminate between different economies, the relative “flatness” of indifference 
curves may be important. Jordan was free to modify total income in order to change 
the curvature of Cobb-Douglas indifference curves. We do not have this possibility, 
and so have to use a different construction.
We follow Jordan by first showing the uniqueness theorem for allocation 
mechanisms defined on the class of environments E f. We define several binary 
relations on the class of Cobb-Douglas economies Ec: the similarity relation Sn 




























































































the message relation induced by the equal income Walrasian mechanism. Two 
economies are similar relative to a mechanism tt if they have the same equilibrium 
net trades, the same slopes of their indifference curves at these trades and the same 
incomes. Two economies are “message related” by a mechanism n if both have the 
same equilibrium message under 7r. The basic strategy of the proof is to show that if 
7i is a fair mechanism with minimal informational requirements the three binary 
relations are equivalence relations and that the partitions induced on the class of 
economies Ec by the three of them are exactly the same. The proof hinges on the 
fact that every equivalence class contains one and only one member of the canonical 
class E* so that in an informationally efficient mechanism, where the message 
partitions should not be finer, what happens in E* must be the same as what happens 
everywhere. Now, it turns out that in the canonical class the equal income Walrasian 
outcome is the only fair outcome. This fact is later used to show that any 
informationally efficient mechanism is essentially the same as the equal income 
Walrasian because the outcomes are the same and the message spaces 
homeomorphic.
Let us start by defining the similarity relation rigorously. Since in the Cobb- 
Douglas class of environments Ec aggregate endowments are strictly positive and 
there is strict monotonicity, the fairness requirement ensures that every agents' final 
consumption will be contained in the strictly positive orthant. Furthermore, the 
corresponding supporting price will equal the unique normalized utility gradient at 
the final consumption point. This allows us to construct the following 
correspondence. Given a mechanism jt = (M,p ,h) define ipij: Ec->M\v that assigns a 
set of points in the Walrasian message space to every environment. For any given 
e£ E°, let us define ( p,z, r) =y-n(e) as follows 
f z=h!\i(e)]
(4)
_ DuHui +zf) 
p ~ 11 D j(J  +4)11
^  =p<J
Hence, the image under ipxr of a given environment is given by the outcome of 
the given mechanism (the trade z), the normalized utility gradient at the 
corresponding final consumption point and the vector of values of initial 
endowments of the n agents. If the message correspondence is a function on E°, then 
rpTX is also a function. Notice also that depends upon the mechanism.
Two economies ~e and e in Ec are said to be similar relative to mechanism 
7i - (M,p,h) if they have the same image under tpjt, that is, if VP71 ( e)=t|>jr ( e). In this 
case we write e Sn e. It is easily verified that if the message correspondence of the 
mechanism, p, is a function on Ec, S-ji is an equivalence relation that induces a 
partition of EP into equivalence classes. When there is no possibility of confusion, 





























































































Recall that in figure 5 we represented the k-th agent of two similar economies. 
It follows from the definition of similarity that we can stay within the same 
equivalence class if we modify the agents’ characteristics as was done in that figure.
The next Lemma establishes that there exists a bijection between the quotient 
space of EP/S and the subclass of environments E*, defined in (3). This means that 
in every equivalence class there is one and only one element of £*, which can be 
considered its canonical representation.
LEMMA 6.1. Suppose that (M, p, h) is an allocation m echanism  on EP which is:
a) fair,
b) inform ationally decentralized.
G iven any ~e£EP there exists a unique e*£ E* which is similar to it.
PROOF: A s was seen in Lem m a 5.1 , in the subclass o f  environm ents £ *  the fair 
correspondence is a sing le  valued function that g iv es equal consum ption as the
1 n
only fair allocation, that is, it must be the case that to' +z' = V toA. Therefore,
nk=l
w hen restricted to E*, the realization  o f  the m echanism  h°p and the fair 
correspondence F  m ust coincide.
Let (p ,lr)eA *» ln /*»ln be the image of e under ip. Since f/>,ifJ£ Mw for some 
environment , it is the equilibrium message of some environment under the
I n
equal income Walrasian process. Hence, by (2) we must have 
Define the economy e*€ E* by taking the initial endowments:
(5) to
j
1 ‘  P jS
Let e* be the environment in which all agents have the same Cobb-Douglas 
utility function with unit coefficients and the initial endowments are given by 
to* defined in (5). It is easily verified that this environment belongs to E*. 
Indeed,
so that aggregate initial endowments are strictly positive.
Let z*=h[\\(e*)] be the outcome of the mechanism. Since p and F  coincide on 





























































































*i - l  
ZJ ~n » ? -»7
Substituting for the values of to j* given in (5) we obtain
,*i_
zy
i n n / it, ,
* = 4 -  i * + i p A - n Y J jnpjt f a  k=i ni £ i J




Taking into account that feasibility requires \ . t i= 0  and equality (2), we finally
i=l
obtain




P j ' nk=l
and therefore it must be the case that h[p(e*)]=z*=z. Moreover, since the 
parameters of the utility function equal one and final consumption of every 
agent equals average consumption, it is easily verified that the utility gradient 
of any agents' utility at (to** + z‘) is given by
Du*i(u>*i+ zf) =
riW nW  nVT 
* * * ' ** * co 7 co ? <0 /
V c)
where co7 - - 1 ^ 1 and w= We know that for this economy equality
(6) implies
D u*i(u*i + zf) =
W n / _
r P
Hence, for any agent k the utility gradient is proportional to the price vector. 
Finally, let us verify that the values of initial endowments are the same for any 





























































































To show that e* is unique, let e be an economy in E* similar to e. Then they 
have the same equilibrium trade z=h[p(i)]=h[p(e)]. But by Lemma 5.1, in the 
subclass E* the only fair allocation is fair division. Hence, if the mechanism is 
fair we must have <jl)(+z! = co**+ z* for all i. Hence d5!=w*( and the result is 
established.
The next step is to show that if the message space of an arbitrary mechanism 
n=<M,p,/t) is of minimal dimension, then all similar economies must have the same 
message. The proof of this lemma, that relies on the local homology of manifolds, 
follows closely the basic idea in Jordan [1982],
LEMMA 6.2. Suppose that (M, p, h) is an allocation mechanism on EE such that:
a) it is fair,
b) it is informationally decentralized,
c) the message space is a nT-dimensional manifold, and
d) the message correspondence p is a continuous function.
If two economies in Ec, e and e are similar, then \s.(e) =p(&).
PROOF: The result is first shown to be true for economies in the subclass E* 
with the uniqueness property defined in (1) and later extended to the Cobb- 
Douglas class EE.
Step 1. The statement is true if both e and e are in E*. Indeed, if e and e are 
similar, it follows from the uniqueness part of Lemma 5.1 that e = £ and, a 
fortiori, \x(e) =p(e).
Step 2. Let e* be the economy in E* similar to e, which exists in view of 
Lemma 5.1. Let U be an open neighborhood of e*eUQE*. Then U is
homeomorphic to V=p[UJ. Indeed, consider the mapping v:E  -OR given by
vft*,toj=ox This is clearly a homeomorphism of E* into an open subset of 91 n ''
so that we shall consider E* as an open subset of .'R n 7 . Using theorem A.l in 
Greenberg 13 we conclude that V is an open set in M which is homeomorphic to 
U.
Step 3. Let q=nEand let Hq(M,M-m*) denote the g-th singular homology 
module of M relative to M-m* with integral coefficients. Now we claim that 
Hq(M,M-m*)= Z s  where ZTs the set of integers, and the homomorphism 
i*:Hq(V,V-v*)-> H q(M ,M -m*) induced by the inclusion map 
i:(V,V-v*)-'(M,M-m*) is an isomorphism. Indeed, since the message space is a 
«^dimensional manifold, it follows from theorem ^ a .2 in Greenberg [1967]
*3 see statement 118.10 in Greenberg [1967], page 82.




























































































that I. Moreover, the subset M-VCM-w* can be excised.
Indeed, since M -V is closed and M-m* is open, the closure of M -V is contained 
in the interior of M-m* and proposition A.3 of Greenberg [1967,p.60] can be 
applied. By definition of excision i* is an isomorphism.
Step 4. We show that for every economy e€ U-e*, paths of economies C(e,t) 
(joining e and e*) and G(e,t) (joining e and e) can be constructed in such a way 
that for every t, in the economies G(e,t) and C(e,t) all agents have the same 
normalized utility gradients at z = h[p(e)]  and the same value of initial 
endowments at the supporting prices. Indeed, given two similar economies 2 
and e in E°, let e* be the unique similar economy in E* (which exists by 
Lemma 5.1) and let (p,z,r)= \f(e)=\\>(2)=y(e*). By definition of tp, 
z=h[\i(e)l=h[\x(e)]-h[p(e*)] and the utility gradients at <c'+z( to*' + z‘ and 
&‘+z‘ are proportional to p. Hence we have:
, . u>/+4'
(7) a = \ ‘ {.
“ 7 +4
where a j  is the coefficient of the Cobb-Douglas utility function. Now define
the function G/1/x [0,1 ] —► given by $=G(e,t), where e=(u>,&) is the
economy given by:
<1j  = t(bj + (l-t)U)j
a j= n-t(i-x i)i
t(hj +
tbjJ +(/-t)u>li+ i
where A' is the constant given in (7). Let us check now that the required 
properties are satisfied:
1. G(e,0)=e for all e£E*. Let e =(co,o) with a  = ( l , l be an economy in E*. 
Then
iSj = O-ooj+ff-Ojtoj = toj
d) = /  1-0(1-Xl)l
o&>Lj+ u y t j
and therefore G(e,0) =e for all e£E*.




























































































“ H  = &i
« H "  ]
Now consider the function C:U* [0,1 ]-»Zic given by C(e,t) =le* + (I-t)e so that 
C(e,t) is a convex combination of the economies e and e* in E*.
3. We claim that for any e<£ U the utility gradients in the economies C(e,t) and 
G(e,t) at z are proportional. Let e and e be given by e=(3>,&)=G(e,t) and 
e=(5>,&)=C(e,t). Then we have
&jA‘
(tXU (1-t))







where A1 = (5 Lj + - 0  andk is a constant.
4. Finally we have to verify that p 5 ‘=p5‘=ri. First, note that the initial 
endowments of the unique economy e* in E* similar to e constructed in lemma 
6.1 are such that p+o*‘ =p6'J for all Then, it follows
p&i =p(t&)i+(1 -t)dy) =tpii)i + (1 -l)fts} =¥ = tpw'+i + (I -t)p(d =p&‘.
Step 5. We show that if m* is the equilibrium message for the economy e*, 
[i[G(e,t)]*m* for all U-e* and 0<t<l. Since p is injective on E* we have 
that \i[C(e,t)]*m* for all e£U -e*  and 0<t<l. Now, suppose by way of 
contradiction that \ilG(e,t)l=m* for some ef. U-e* and some /. Then the utility 
gradients of all agents in the economy G(e,t) at z are proportional to p. Indeed, 
since m*£p[G(e,t)lnp(e*), then z=h(m*) is the outcome of the mechanism for 
both environments G(e,t) and e*. By the crossing condition it follows that m* is 
also an equilibrium  message for the “crossed” environm ent, 
m*S.[i[G(e,t)®ie*]. But the process is fair and therefore the outcome z=h(m*) 
must necessarily be a fair allocation for the economy G(e,t)®ie*. Thus, the 
trade z gives a final allocation which is Pareto optimal for the economies 
G(e,t)®ie* and e*. Hence, the normalized utility gradient of the i-th agent 
equals the price vector:
Duffuji +2) _ Du*k(d*i +zk) _ .




























































































By the result in 3 it follows that the normalized utility gradient at z of any agent 
in the zn\\ronmen\.e=(&A)=C(e,t) is equal to p. Moreover, by the conclusion 
of 4 we know that p&‘ =r‘. It follows that the value of final consumption of the 
t'-th agent after the trade z in the economy e=(&,d.)-C(e,t) is given by
. 1 n _ . . ' 
p(&i +?) =/* +pif = -  Yf k.  Hence utility is maximized at cb1 +zl subject to the 
nk=l
average income constraint for every agent and therefore z is the outcome of the 
equal income Walrasian mechanism for the economy i=C(e,t) . But by 
construction C(e,t) is contained in the subclass E*. By Lemma 5.1 the fair 
correspondence is single-valued on E* and thus z is necessarily the outcome of 
any other mechanism which is fair on E*. In particular, z€ h[\x(C(e,t)J. Then we 
can write
for all /.By definition of ip it follows that n>[C(e,t)/=(p,z,r), and this can only 
happen if e=e* because, as shown in step 1, ip is injective on E*.
Step 6. We finally show that e and e have the same equilibrium message. In fact 
we shall show that ji(eJ=p(£*)=m*. A similar argument establishes that 
p(e)=p('e*)=m* and the result follows. Suppose by way of contradiction that 
p(e) *m*. In that case the statement of step 5 could be strengthened and written 
as \xlG(e,t)j*m* for all e£ U -e*  and t£ [0 ,l]. Define the function^ 
<P:(V,V-m*)x[0,l given by (P(m,t) =\i(G[p~l(m),t]). Let us
denote by f:(V,V-m*)-+(m,M-m*) the inclusion map given by !(m)=m for all 
me V, and by j:(V,V-m*)-> (m,M-m*) the constant map given by j(m ) =m=\.\(e) 
for all me V. It is easily verified that:
a) For all /e [0,1 ] and all me V-m* <l>(m,t)*rn*. Indeed, if m*m* and <?e (m)
then e±e* because p is injective on U . But \x[G(e,t)]*m* for all V -e* and
teio.11.
b) <t>(m,0) is the inclusion map f:(V,V-m*)-*(m,M-m*). Indeed, 
<P(m,0)= p ( G [ \ i ~ \ ( m ) ,0 ] ( m ) ] = m  for all me V.
c) <S>(m,l) is the constant map j:(V,V-m*)-> (m,M-m*). Indeed, from the 
definitions of G and it follows that <P(m,l)=plG(p'^(m),l)/=p( e)=m. Hence, 
we can conclude that 4> is a homotopy between the inclusion map i and the
15 Following the notation in algebraic topology we denote by F:(V,V-m*)*lO,l]->(MM-m*) a function 






























































































constant map j  defined above. By theorem 13.13 in Greenberg16 it follows that 
the induced hom om orphism s i*:Hn (V,V-m*)->Hn(m,M-m*) and 
j*:Hn(V,V-m*)-+Hn(m,M-m*) on the n-th relative homology group modulo V 
relative to V-m* are equal. But j  is the constant map, so that _/* is the zero 
homomorphism, and so is j*. But this contradicts the result established in step 
3, according to which if the message space is of minimal dimension i# is an 
isomorphism. This completes the proof.
The following theorem establishes that if a mechanism 7r is informationally 
efficient, the partition induced by the similarity relation Sn is the same as that 
induced by the equal income Walrasian message relation 7<o . In particular, the 
outcome of the mechanism must be the equal income Walrasian one.
PROPOSITION 6.3. Let be an allocation mechanism on E° such that
a) it is fair,
b) it is informationally decentralized,
c) its message space is of minimal dimension, that is, M  is a n ̂ dimensional 
manifold,
d) its message correspondence p is a continuous function on the class of Cobb- 
Douglas environments E°.
Then poofej =y(e) for all e££c
PROOF: Suppose that the statement is not true, so that there is some <?€ E? such 
that p w(e) * t|)fe) = Since (M,p,/t) is a fair mechanism we know that & +z
is a Pareto optimal allocation in the economy e. Therefore, the utility gradients 
of any two agents i and j  at <J)l+ z‘ and &J+ zi are proportional to the price vector 
p  and excess demands add up to zero. Hence, if z is not the equal income 
Walrasian trade it must be the case that for at least two agents 
pf&i+z?) <p(&k+zk). This was represented in figure 4, where the final 
consumption vectors of agents i and k are on different hyperplanes (but 
parallel because of Pareto optimality).
We shall show that if this is true it is always possible to construct a similar 
economy e* in which i envies k. This was done in the introduction and is 
illustrated in figure 6
More formally, let e*£ E* be the unique environment similar to e. Since e* 
and e are similar we know that





























































































I „ _ p m & i  +V) _ Du*(u>*i +z‘)
P ~ bui(& i+Z)\T~  17Eu*(u*i +§\ I
fi =p&i =pu>*i
In view of these equalities, we must have p(ixi*‘+ zf) <p(w*k+ $ )  so that the 
values of the final consumption vectors are still different. On the other hand, 
since E*, all agents have the same Cobb-Douglas utility function u* and 
since the normalized utility gradients are equal, all final consumption vectors 
must necessarily lie on the same ray and z is the equilibrium trade for the 
environment e * as depicted in figure 6. But in this case, because of 
monotonicity, agent k envies agent i contradicting the assumption that 
n  = is a fair mechanism. Indeed, in the subclass E* the only fair
allocation is the equal income Walrasian one. This completes the proof.
Given a fair mechanism n , consider the binary relation T-n in Ec defined as 
follows: eTne<*> \i(e)=\i(e), that is, two environments are related if they have the 
same equilibrium messages. If the message correspondence is a single valued 
function, then T  can be shown to be an equivalence relation which induces a 
partition of Ec into equivalence classes. Now we shall show that, if rt is an 
informationally efficient mechanism, the partition of the class of environments Ec 
induced by the message correspondence p is finer than that induced by the similarity 
relation Sji-
Lemma 6.4. Let Y[={M,\x,E) be an allocation mechanism such that
a) it is fair;
b) it is informationally decentralized;
c) the message space is of minimal dimension, that is, M  is a «^dimensional 
manifold.
d) the message correspondence p is a continuous function on the class of Cobb- 
Douglas environments E°.
Then p(e) =ii(e) implies \p(e) =y(e).
PROOF: Let m=n(e) =\x(e) and z-h(m). Since the process II is assumed to be 
fair it must be the case that &>‘+z‘>0 and &‘+z‘>0 for all agents. But for the 
class of Cobb-Douglas economies the utility gradients are always uniquely 
defined at interior points of the positive orthant. Since the process is 
informationally decentralized, m must also be an equilibrium message for any 
crossed economy because n(e)nn(e)=n(e®ie)nn(e®i&). But fnd\x(e®ke) for 




























































































i=h(m)eF(e)OF(e)r\F(e®ie)nF{ e®i£). In particular, we know that z. is a 
Pareto optimal trade for e and therefore, there exists a price vector p  such that 
the utility gradient of any agent /, D u'(toi+zl), is proportional to p .
But at the same time we know that for any agent k, z=h(m)£F(e®k~e), and if z is 
Pareto optimal for £®]<e it must be the case that Dd^f&^+z^) is proportional to 
the other utility gradients DU((b‘+z‘), for i*k, which in turn are proportional to 
\oC;p)■ Hence, the normalized utility gradients of any agent at the final 
allocations, toi+hi(fh) and &‘+h>(m) respectively are equal to some A. It 
remains to show that F=pfoi=p&>i=?i for all i. By Proposition 6.3,
(p,Z,r)=\p(e) implies (p,z,r)=pu(e). Then it follows from (2) that
/ n




By a sim ilar argument
(p,Z,r)=\f(e®i~e) implies np 'i = Therefore =r‘. Hence v?(~e) =\p(e) and
k*i
the proof is complete.
Since in lemma 6.2 it was shown that we establish the equality of both.
Lemmas 6.2 and 6.4 taken together imply that, if tt is an informationally 
efficient mechanism, the partitions induced by the similarity relation Sn , the 
mechanism's message relation 7jt and the equal income Walrasian message relation 
7to are identical. Now we shall use this fact to show that for the class of Cobb- 
Douglas economies Ec every decentralized mechanism with a minimal message 
space is essentially the same as the equal income Walrasian mechanism 
n w={Mw,pwMw) in the sense that it can be transformed into it by a 
homeomorphism <p as shown in figure 7.
E ------------------------- ► M u
Figure 7
PROPOSITION 6.5. Let n=(M,p,/i) be an allocation m echanism  such that
a) it is fair;




























































































c) its message space is of minimal dimension, that is, M is a «^dimensional 
manifold.
d) its message correspondence p is a continuous function on the class of Cobb- 
Douglas environments EP.
Then if M=p[Ec], there exists a homeomorphism cp:M-*Mw such that: 
a) Mw=<P°P
b) /lyvoCp=/i.
PROOF: Let cp:M->A/w be the correspondence given by tp(m) =ip/|W (m)]. From 
Lemmas 6.2 and 6.4 it follows that \i.(e) =n(e) if and only if y fe )  =ip(e). Since 
(p[p(e)] =cp(e) and <p/\ji(Ec)/=M w , cp is a bijection.Finally, it remains to show 
that cp and cp'  ̂ are continuous. In order to show that cp~/ is continuous let 
{(pv,zv,rv)} be a sequence in Mw converging to ( p,z,r). We have to demonstrate 
that the sequence {mv}, where mv =<p~l[(pv,zv,rv)]  converges to 
m=r4)~ll(p,z,r)/. By taking
h, ^ v +Pvz*vcoy-------—-----
PJS
-V
« 7 = 7
’ for all i , j  and v.
we define a sequence of economies ev=(iov,ocv/) in the class E* with the 
uniqueness property which converges to e=(u>,a) given by
- 4 ' for all i , j  and v.
But by s t a t e m e n t  b of  the p re se n t  p r o p o s i t io n  
mv /pv,zv,rv/=tp~l ĵjyfev) J = n ( e v ) f o r  a l l  v a n d
m=q>~ll p,z,r]=V~l (pj(~e))=pCe). Since p is continuous, {ev} converges to e implies 
{my} converges to m=\i(e). Hence cp"' is continuous. Since M  and Mw are 
manifolds of the same dimension, cp~̂  is in fact a homeomorphism 17 of Mw onto 
M and the proof is complete.




























































































7. The uniqueness theorem in the class of classical economies.
Now we can extend the uniqueness theorem to a wider class of environments. 
In particular, we shall consider a more general class of utility functions U which are 
real valued continuous, strictly monotone on X(ul) and strictly quasi-concave 
functions. Let Eg denote the general class of economies as defined at the beginning 
of section 2. The proof of assertion iii is almost immediate and ii follows easily from 
i. In steps 3 and 4 the proof relies on analogous techniques of finding appropriate 
similar economies in Ec.
UNIQUENESS THEOREM 7.1. Let Tl=(M,p,h) be an allocation mechanism on EE such 
that
a) it is fair;
b) it is informationally decentralized;
c) its message space is of minimal dimension, that is, M  is a connected 
«/dimensional manifold.
d) the restriction of p to EE is a continuous function .
e) \i\EE] is a closed subset of the message space M.
Then there exists a homeomorphism such that:
i) <p[pl(el)J=p w(el) for every agent i and every economy ES.
ii) cp/p (e)]=[iw(e) for every economy e£E8.
iii) hw[cp(m)]=h(m) for all m£M.
PROOF: The proof is organized in several steps.
Step 1. The Cobb-Douglas class Ec spans the whole message space,
By the same argument as in the beginning of step 2 of Lemma 6.2, given any 
e£Ec and any open neighborhood Ue of e, then p(Ue) is open in M. Then 
p/£c/=U {ix(Ue): e€Ec} is the union of open sets and so it is open. But it is 
also closed by assumption. Since M  is connected, it is the only open and closed 
set 18, so that \i[Ec]=M.
Step 2. We claim that the homeomorphism cp:M—>Mw constructed in 
Proposition 6.5 satisfies condition iii. But this is an immediate consequence of 
the result in Step 1 and the definition of the function cp.
18 See Kelley [1955,p.53].



























































































Step 3. We claim that given any economy e£ES  and any agent i, 
<p/(i*VcOy. Let (p, z, r)£ If el =(uf, to1), define a new environment
e given by ek = (uk, &k), where
&k=of +3-z/c
ftk=it
In the environment e all agents have identical utility functions and by Lemma 
5.1 we know that the only fair allocation is equal division. Since by 
construction final consumptions are identical, <bk+zk=uf +z  ̂ for all 
k£ {1,2,...,n}, z is the equilibrium trade for the environment 2, that is, 
z=h[p(e)j. Moreover, if (p, z, r) is an equilibrium message of the equal income
/ n
Walrasian mechanism LIw, it must be true that p ^  =~ for all k. Using
s=l
the definition of &k given above we get
Hence we can write:
z=h[\i(i)J
< _ D(<k(&k + z k) _ + zb
1 P ~ bu k J&k+g i  1Tq/(W +Jll
krk=p&k far all k.
This shows that (p,z,r)£ y(e). Let m£\x(e). Since the process is informationally 
decentralized and e1 =&, m£pi(e‘) and (p, z,r)=<p(m)£cp/ptfe*)/.
Step 4. Given any economy e£ES, and any agent we claim that 
(p/pYeO/CpJjfeO- Let in £ p'feU and (p, z,r)='p(m). We have to show that for 
every agent (p, z,r)£ nh{e‘). In other words, we have to establish that


































































































so that (bl + z; maximizes the utility function u‘ subject to the average income 
1 n
constraint p(itb'+zO  ̂- By the result in step 1 we know that there exists a
nk=l
Cobb-Douglas economy e€ Ec such that jjfêJ =m. By the uniqueness result of 
proposition 5.6 we know that pw(ê)=q>fri(ê)]=<f)(m)=(p,z,r)- Hence (p,z,r) is 
the only equilibrium message of the equal income Walrasian mechanism Uw 
for the environment "e. By definition of the equal income Walrasian 
mechanism, 11 u>, this implies for any agent k
' Dûk(&k + zk) _ 
iBû*fcb* + ̂ l l  ~P
(11) ' p(&k +zk)= £ /*
S= 1
rk =pd)k
For all agents (who have Cobb-Douglas utility functions) in the environment è, 
all utility gradients at (<bk + zk) are proportional to p  because tt is a fair 
mechanism and therefore z is a Pareto optimal trade for the economy è. On the 
other hand, since m eplf?) fi p(è) it follows from informational 
decentralization that m€ pfeSV è). Again z =h(m) must be a Pareto optimal trade 
for the environment (è®i è). Pareto optimality implies that the utility gradient of 
the /-th agent at ( cbk + zk) is also proportional to p. Hence we have shown that
(8) is satisfied.
In order to show (9) let us construct a Cobb-Douglas economy e£ E c as shown 
in figure 8 below. We define new Cobb-Douglas utility functions uk and initial 
endowments (ck in such a way that the final consumptions <bk +zk lie on the 
same ray as &>l + zl, that the utility gradients at such points remain unchanged 
and that the supporting hyperplane is the same as before. Formally, define the 
characteristic of the k-th agent, ek=(uk,(ck)t as follows:
(12) < *'*> -*
(13)
_k p(<x>k + zk) W w j+ 4  u
aJ= P ( ^ )  w  4
where VV= (tòy + Zy) , W = 1 ^  (ôjy + Zy) and &j  is the corresponding parameter
of the Cobb-Douglas utility function in the environment ~e. It is easily verified 




























































































X' h p(&k + ?k)
-----------
(cô* +zf) >0. From (12) and (13) it follows that the utility
£=7 - p((bl +zf) 
gradients are equal in both environments:
, , , &!fW p(&k+7k) w  c o j+ 4  , , ,
Djuk(u * - >=(tik+:k) = p fa i +J) IV &k +7k (& kV f) ~J&k-^k)
Hence, using (11) we get the following equalities for all k:
Duk(a>k+zk) _
I B f W + i T T  ~ P
. i, p(&>k+£)
0* =—:—•— jroto * • . -rf- p (ü ‘ +z!) -p?k =p&k=rk.
p (u l +zf)
p (ù k +zk) =pJ ^ r - +J \ j  p(ü,i+ j) =p(<bk+£)= Jn
But this means that (p,z,r) is the equilibrium message of the equal income 
W alrasian mechanism, and using Proposition 6.5 we have that 
(p,z,r)-\iw(è)=(p[\i(è)J. Hence e is similar to ë and by Proposition 6.2 
p(è) =p(e) =m.
Then m£\i(e®i 2) and z-h[\x(e®i e)]. Now we show that it cannot be the case
1 n i n
that p(& + # )< -  V ik since, in view of (11) p(0*+ £)  = -  Vr*, and this would 
nk=l n s=l
imply p(&>‘ +z}) <p(&k+jk) The situation would be analogous to that in figure
8. But then z is the equilibrium trade for the economy e®i e and it is clear that 
agent i envies all other agents, contradicting the assumption that fl =(M,p,h) is
a fair mechanism. The only way to avoid this contradiction is that
1 n





























































































Finally it rem ains to show that (10) is satisfied . Since 
Hw(&) e)] ̂ q fm ) = (p,z,r), (p,z,r) is the only equilibrium message of the
equal income Walrasian mechanism ITw for the environment e. Therefore it




I n i n i n
From this it follows that P ^‘~ n ~ n X rS _ n y  Is +r*=r‘ and the proof
s=7 s=l ‘ s=l
is complete.
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